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RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDIES: THE BURGER
COURT IN FULL BLOOM
UNITED STATES SENATOR THOMAS F. EAGLETON*
Since the dawn of the Burger Court over fifteen years ago, many be-
lieve it has defied labels. At one point it was said that the Burger Court
".. . may indeed be like Churchill's much-scorned pudding, without a
theme."' I strongly disagree. I see the Burger Court, as Justice Black-
mun said last year, "moving to the right," going "where it wants to go
• ..by hook or crook."2 True, the Court has puzzled its critics by fail-
ing to directly overrule watershed Warren Court decisions; instead, it has
skirted them, chipped away at them, and riddled them with exceptions.
I will first highlight recent cases that signal new trends of the Burger
Court. Then I will offer my own theory about where I think the Burger
Court revolution is really leading. I will conclude with a glimpse at those
in line for Court appointment and with a prediction that-with an al-
ready sharply divided Court-the new appointees will surely beget a
solid reactionary majority.
CRIMINAL LAW
Let us first look at criminal law, an area of the law in which the Court
has been most active. The exclusionary rule, which protects against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, has been a brooding omnipresence over
the Court. In 1984, at a dizzying pace, the Court created "inevitable
discovery," 3 "public safety,"4 and, most significantly, "good faith"5 ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule. If this trend continues, we may witness
the first direct reversal not only of the Warren Court decision that ex-
tended the exclusionary rule to the states,6 but also of the rule itself,
* I want to thank my legal staff counsel, Kathleen J. Tuttle, for her invaluable assistance in
my preparation of this article.
1. Herman Schwartz, Professor of Law, American University, Washington, D.C. (November,
1979).
2. Spoken in a private speech at the Cosmos Club, Washington, D.C., September, 1984.
3. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
4. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).
5. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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which dates to 1914.7
In my judgment, the exclusionary rule is the fourth amendment, and
its protection is critically important. To make this point is not to favor
"coddling criminals." One need only remember that the roots of the
fourth amendment lie in the fear the American colonists and the English
had of the tryannical authority of the King's troops, who would barge
into homes to search on mere suspicion. The ever-increasing resentment
of the colonists impelled William Pitt the Elder to defend their interests
in Parliament with the unforgettable words:
The poorest man in his cottage bid defiance to the crown. It may be frail-
its roof may shake-the wind may enter-the rain may enter-but the King
of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of the
ruined tenement.8
The fourth amendment, aided by the exclusionary rule, protects each one
of us from the overreach of the government.
The Court has taken equally troubling actions with the fifth amend-
ment, which protects us from self-incrimination. Early in 1985, in Ore-
gon v. Elstad,9 the Court held that this constitutional protection does not
require suppression of lawful evidence even when such evidence flows
from an illegally obtained confession. This holding prompted Justice
Brennan to contend in his dissent that: "It is but the latest of the escalat-
ing number of decisions that are making this tribunal increasingly irrele-
vant in the protection of individual rights." 10
FIRST AMENDMENT
The religion portion of the first amendment is another area in which
the Court is drifting rightward.
No other Warren Court rulings have generated as much controversy
for as long a period as its school prayer decisions.1 Those decisions
sought to prevent government from putting its power and prestige behind
a particular belief. But match this principle with what the Burger Court
held in a closely-divided vote (5-4) last year in Lynch v. Donnelly, that a
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. Ervin, Sam J., Jr., The Exclusionary Rule: An Essential Ingredient of the Fourth Amend-
ment, Sup. Cr. REv. 282, 285 (1983).
9. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985).
10. d at 1322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
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city may put its imprimatur on a Christmas nativity scene placed in front
of the city hall. 1
2
Concurring separately, Justice O'Connor confidently asserted that
when viewing a city-sponsored creche, citizens "fairly understand"
13
from the context that the government intends no endorsement of Chris-
tian beliefs. That statement is a startling reversal of the Court's pre-
sumptions twenty years ago about "public perceptions." In the past, the
Court cared about minority perceptions; 4 in this case, it evidently cared
only about those of the majority.
Demonstrating how profoundly unsettled and unpredictable these
church-state waters are, the Burger Court closed out its 1984-85 term by
calling for more government "neutrality" toward religion and less "ac-
commodation" than in the previous term.
In Wallace v. Jaffree,"5 the Court rejected Alabama's "moment of si-
lence" statute. The Court's ruling centered on the fact that the bill's
legislative history revealed the statute to be a blatant pretext for re-
turning prayer to the public schools. However, the dizzying array of
concurrences and dissents indicates that a "pure" moment of silence stat-
ute without such a legislative history would be acceptable. It appears
that such a statute could even include "prayer" among other listed alter-
natives, so long as there is no indication by the government that it would
prefer that students use the moment to pray.
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 6 the Justices next struck down a
Connecticut law that gave employees an absolute right to take their cho-
sen Sabbath day off. With such a law, the Court held, "[t]he state thus
commands that Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all
secular interests at the workplace; the statute takes no account of the
convenience or interests of the employer. . . . This unyielding weighting
in favor of Sabbath observors over all other interests contravenes a fun-
damental principle of the Religion Clauses ... .
In two other cases, School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball 8
and Aguilar v. Felton, 9 a narrow 5-4 majority held unconstitutional pro-
12. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
13. Id. at 1369 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14. See, eg., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
15. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
16. 53 U.S.L.W. 4853 (1985).
17. Id. at 4855.
18. 53 U.S.L.W. 5006 (1985).
19. 53 U.S.L.W. 5013 (1985).
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grams using public school teachers to provide remedial assistance in pri-
vate religious schools. The former case held that the school district
failed to go far enough in supervising its programs to avoid any religious
content. As for the latter case, the Court declared the programs uncon-
stitutional because the school district's efforts to ensure that a religious
message was not conveyed went too far, enmeshing state authorities in
the religious institutions. Both circumstances, the Court held, "infringe
precisely those Establishment Clause violations at the root of the prohibi-
tion of excessive entanglement." 20
These close votes show that, with even one more conservative Justice,
the recent insistence on strict separation easily might be supplanted by
renewed tolerance toward the mixing of government and religion. More-
over, the Court's work in this area is not over. Although the Court in the
1984-85 term heard an unusually large number of religion cases, already
four new church-state cases have been accepted for argument in the next
term.21
CIVIL RIGHTS
Let us turn now to civil rights, an area in which the Reagan Adminis-
tration has sought to divert the nation from its twenty-year commitment
to equal rights. Lamentably, Administration policy has begun to gain
some ground with the Court. In 1984, the Court took the teeth out of
the most important law governing sex discrimination in education and,
by implication, jeopardized civil rights statutes protecting racial minori-
ties, the disabled, and the elderly.22
Until last year, the Court had not decided whether racial preference
could be squared with the Equal Protection clause. But in Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,23 it came close to resolving this conflict in
the negative. The Court held that a seniority system takes precedence
over an affirmative action plan when layoffs are involved. The Court
went beyond the question presented, purporting to declare that Title VII,
20. Id. at 5016.
21. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1985, at B6. The issues presented in these cases include "equal ac-
cess" to public school facilities by voluntary student religious groups; a military dress code prohibi-
tion against wearing a Jewish yarmulke; a government requirement that members of a religious
group submit their social security numbers in order to get welfare benefits, even though use of the
numbers violates their beliefs; and use of federal funds to educate a blind person studying for the
ministry.
22. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
23. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
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a potent antidiscrimination law, allows relief only to victims of actual or
direct discrimination, as opposed to an entire race burdened only indi-
rectly by a past history of societal discrimination.24 Although President
Reagan's Justice Department quickly heralded the opinion as ruling out
all preferential treatment of minorities and women through quotas and
other devices,2 5 it is clear that our highest tribunal has left us without
final and definitive guidance. Such guidance may be forthcoming and
may well outlaw the bulk of affirmative action programs.
Surprisingly, in one respect the Burger Court has largely maintained
the Warren Court's momentum in civil rights: it has upheld the use of
limited and well-defined busing as a device for school desegregation.26
ABORTION
In concluding this brief review of these substantive areas, I cannot
overlook the Court's abortion ruling, Roe v. Wade,27 in which, to quote
Harvard Law Professor Archibald Cox, "the Justices read into the gener-
ality of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a new
'fundamental right' not remotely suggested by the words."
28
Most liberals would single out this decision as perhaps the one instance
in which the Burger Court rose above its conservative ideology and "did
what was right." I do not share that view. Rather, I believe that in one
swift edict, the Court federalized a state law issue and usurped authority
over a matter previously thought to be within the domain of legislative
discretion. A reconstituted Supreme Court with two or three Reagan
appointees may very well reverse Roe v. Wade.
THE REAL AGENDA: USING PROCEDURE TO GUT SUBSTANCE
Even after criticizing the Court's resolution of the abortion issue, I
believe that the Burger Court is sometimes troubling less for the cases it
resolves than for the cases it ignores. In my view, the hallmark of the
Burger Court will be its systematic refusal to provide a federal judicial
24. See Fallon and Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of Racial Justice, Sup. CT.
REv. 1 (1984).
25. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 1.
26. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
27. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
28. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTr 51-55, 112-14,
117-18 (1976).
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forum for the enforcement of important constitutional rights. It is fine to
say that the Burger Court has judiciously refrained from rolling back
Warren Court precedents, but when the means for enforcement are dis-
mantled, these substantive rights are in fact reduced to rights without
remedies.
Standing
First consider the Court's new standing rules. The Warren Court used
flexible standing guidelines so that litigants with a colorable argument of
being adversely affected by an illegal act could obtain a judicial hearing.29
Since then, considerable gloss has been added,30 but only, I would argue,
to coincide with the Court's view of the underlying merits.
For example, in Allen v. Wright,31 black parents sued the IRS for fail-
ing to withdraw the tax exempt status of private segregated schools.
Although their children attended black public schools, the parents ar-
gued that their children were nonetheless "injured" because the govern-
ment's policy was draining white children from the public schools.
The majority denied standing. It simply refused to believe that grant-
ing preferential tax treatment to white private schools robs black chil-
dren in public schools of a chance for an integrated education. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the majority, noted: "Animating this Court's
holdings was the principle that a federal court . . . is not the proper
forum to press general complaints about the way in which government
goes about its business."32
This statement is a disconcerting, new expression of the shrunken role
of federal courts. Justice Brennan obviously agrees: "[W]e have consist-
ently recognized throughout the last 30 years that the deprivation of a
child's right to receive an education in a desegregated school is a harm of
special significance; surely, it satisfies any constitutional requirement of
injury in fact."'33
29. See generally Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1982).
30. Litigants now must show that a "fairly traceable" causal connection exists between the
claimed injury and the challenged conduct, that the Court's remedial powers would redress the
injury, and that the injury is particular-not shared with the citizenry. See Tushnet, The New Law
of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
31. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
32. Id at 3330.
33. Id. at 3338 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 34 displays equally well the Court's use of
standing to diminish constitutional rights. Lyons involved a black plain-
tiff who, despite offering no threats or resistance at being stopped for a
motor vehicle violation, was subjected to a "choke hold" until he blacked
out. When he awoke gasping for air and spitting up blood and dirt, he
was issued a traffic ticket and released. He sued for damages and sought
injunctive relief to forbid use of deadly force by police officers when an
officer's safety is not threatened. The Court denied standing because the
plaintiff had no reason to anticipate future chokings.
The case has broad ramifications. Lyons may preclude the use of pro-
spective federal equitable relief against policies authorizing persistent
deprivations of constitutional rights, if an individual cannot establish
with substantial certainty that he will be injured in the future.
I am dubious about these standing pronouncements. Justice Rehn-
quist, revealing his own skepticism, said in an important 1982 standing
case35 that ". . . it has not been clear in the opinions of this Court
whether particular features of the 'standing' requirement have been re-
quired by Article III . . . or whether they are requirements the Court
itself has erected and which were not compelled by the language of the
Constitution."
Class Actions
The Court has advanced its constricted view of federal relief in another
way, by backing off the use of class actions. Since 1966,36 class actions
have facilitated aggregation of claims so that less prosperous litigants, or
those with negligible damages, could seek legal redress, whereas alone
they might lack resources or capacity.
From the beginning, the Court has applied rigorous standards to this
procedural aid. In 1969,17 it ruled that members of a class could not
aggregate their individual claims to satisfy the amount-in-controversy re-
quirement for diversity or federal question jurisdiction. A few years
later, in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,38 the Court barred a class ac-
tion even though the named plaintiffs' claims exceeded the amount.
34. 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983).
35. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).
36, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1966 in part to strengthen the use of
class actions.
37. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
38, 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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Zahn held that each class member had to satisfy the amount, thus trans-
forming class actions into a device that protects only those claims which
are sufficiently large not to require class actions in the first place. 39
In essence, class actions started as a device to enable litigants with
important rights at stake but with individually negligible financial inju-
ries (typically civil rights or environmental cases) to get into court by
aggregating damages. Now, the Court seems bent on forcing satisfaction
of the amount-in-controversy requirement on an individual basis. That
really turns the law on its head.
Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus, explicitly recognized in the Constitution,
was restrictively interpreted by early courts. Significantly expanding use
of the "Great Writ," the Warren Court sought to ensure that substantive
constitutional rights would be fully realized. The Court saw habeas
corpus as a necessary remedy against constitutionally infirm state pro-
ceedings. It held that state prisoners may submit their constitutional
claims to federal courts even if they had failed to raise the arguments in
state court, unless the prisoners had "deliberately bypassed" state
remedies.'
Paying little deference to this line of cases, the Burger Court sharply
constricted this doctrine. In 1976, the Court held that a state prisoner
may not obtain habeas relief on an illegal search and seizure claim unless
he had been denied an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim
in state courts.41 The exclusionary rule is thus relegated to an histori-
cally unsympathetic state forum, dramatically altering its practical
significance.
The most extreme hostility to habeas occurred in Engle v. Isaac.4 2
There, prisoners challenged a requirement that they carry the burden of
proving an affirmative defense. They had not objected earlier because the
state appellate courts had upheld this burden. After their convictions,
the rule was reinterpreted to place the burden of disproving the defense
on the prosecution. The Supreme Court denied relief because the defend-
39. See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
40. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
41. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
42. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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ant's lawyers failed to object in a timely fashion, even though they could
not have done so any earlier.
Remedies
So far, I have dwelled upon the inability of plaintiffs to get into federal
court. But once they do, there may be another problem: the Burger
Court has constricted federal remedies by drastically limiting use of equi-
table powers. In Rizzo v. Goode,43 documented and repeated instances of
police abuse had gone unredressed, impelling a federal judge to order city
officials to establish a program to handle citizen complaints. The Burger
Court held that this use of the lower court's equitable powers exceeded
the court's proper role. That means one thing: the Burger Court wants
federal courts to refrain from broad remedial decrees, even where
problems admittedly contain constitutional dimensions.
COURT PERSONALITIES: A SWING TO THE RIGHT
What of these already foreboding legal trends, if one or two more con-
servative appointments are made to the Court, presumably by President
Reagan? Obviously, the consequences depend on who leaves and who
joins the Court. Not knowing either, I suggest that we would do well to
concentrate on three of President Reagan's recent circuit court appoint-
ments said to be on the "most-likely" appointees list.
I refer to Judges Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia of the District of
Columbia Circuit and Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit.'
About these three judges we can quickly say this: they are highly accom-
plished academics, politically conservative, and constitutionally
"interpretivist."
My own view is that, while they boast adherence to the very words of
the original authority propounding a law, they practice this adherence
selectively, in order to reach the most rigid and narrow legal interpreta-
tion. For example, law professor Ronald Dworkin has written that in a
recent decision,45 Judge Bork "shows how little he would need, by way of
argument, to justify sweeping what he dislikes away."46 Professor Dwor-
43. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
44. See Barnes, Reagan's Full Court Press: How the Supreme Court is Going to be Reaganized,
THE NEW REPUBLIC 16 (June 10, 1985); Wermiel, The New Judiciary: Reagan-Picked Judges Put
the Federal Courts on Conservative Path, Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1984, at AI.
45. Dronenberg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
46. Dworkin, Reagan's Justice, The N.Y. Rev. of Books, Nov. 8, 1984, 27 at 31.
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kin concluded that Judge Bork's approach is "the jurisprudence of fiat,
not argument."'47
Judge Bork so abhors "judicial overreach" that in a recent 63-page
dissent48 he excoriated the majority for granting standing to Congress to
obtain an important interpretation of the Constitution's Article I provi-
sion allowing for presidential "pocket-veto" of congressional bills. Judge
Bork argued that the court's role is "solely to decide on the rights of
individuals," not to "correct constitutional errors" such as entertaining
suits directly between the two political branches of the federal govern-
ment.49 He obviously feels the federal courts should not dictate who
wins in disputes between Congress and the President. Nor do I. But I do
think that we all rely on the Supreme Court to say what the rules are.
Judge Scalia's judicial philosophy goes in the same direction although,
if anything, he is more conservative in some substantive areas. Take reli-
gion, where he is even less troubled about church-state involvement than
the present Court. As for judicial restraint, like Judge Bork, Judge Scalia
defers to the other two branches of government, sometimes through
rather strained analysis. For example, he held in one case5 ° that a statute
precluded judicial review of virtually all Veterans Administration deci-
sions regarding veterans' disability benefits, even though the rulemaking
at issue violated the Administrative Procedure Act and even after the VA
told Congress it did not interpret the statute as insulating its rulings from
court scrutiny. This caused the dissent to charge that Judge Scalia's view
". .. constitutes rank judicial interference with a reasonable statutory
interpretation.""1
Judge Posner is distinguishable from the other two for the inventive
approach he brings to the law: to him, efficiency and "wealth-maximiza-
tion" are what the common law is all about. For example, to correct
unlawful searches and seizures, he would abolish the exclusionary rule
and let the free market settle law suits pressed by victims against police
officers. 52
Judge Posner is one of the most prolific circuit judges, so there is no
47. Ad at 31.
48. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 52 (Bork, J., dissenting).
50. Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir.1985).
51. Id. at 929 (Wald, J., dissenting).
52. Warren, Richard Posner Shakes Up the Bench, THE AM. LAW. 75, 76 (Sept. 1983).
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want of opinions indicating his judicial temperament. One case53 in-
volved a prison inmate complaining of blurred vision. After six months
without proper care, the inmate received surgery, but on the wrong eye,
leaving him functionally blind. The inmate requested a jury trial and
also sought court-appointed counsel in his civil suit against prison au-
thorities. Both were denied by the lower court. On appeal, Judge Posner
agreed with the majority that a jury trial should have been granted but,
contrary to the circuit's applicable precedent, ruled that no counsel
should be appointed because ". . . a prisoner who has a good damages
suit should be able to hire a competent lawyer. . by making the pris-
oner go this route we subject the case to the test of the market. . . . If
[he] cannot retain a lawyer on a contingency fee basis the natural infer-
ence to draw is that he does not have a good case."54
Clearly, none of these three judges would divert the Burger Court from
where it is already headed, but instead would most certainly hasten it
getting there.
CONCLUSION
As I have tried to show, the Burger Court does have a theme. It dog-
gedly seeks to close the federal courthouse doors by manipulating juris-
dictional tests, claiming judicial deference to state courts, constricting
federal remedies, and erecting procedural barriers to the combined efforts
of similarly harmed litigants.
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote a famous opinion55 in
which he spoke of the majesty of the Bill of Rights because its purpose
was to withdraw protected liberties from the "vicissitudes of political
controversy" in order to insulate them as "legal principles to be applied
by the courts." He went on to say that our freedoms "may not be sub-
mitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." Were it
only true that the status of our rights and freedoms had nothing
whatever to do with President Ronald Reagan's reelection and his im-
pending opportunity to bring the Burger Court into full bloom.
If I have not appeared exactly ebullient in this review of the Burger
Court, let me conclude with a word on what I believe our highest tribu-
nal should be about. I draw from the words of Harvard Law Professor
53. Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 769-70, citing McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.,
dissenting). See generally Press & McDaniel, Free-Market Jurist, NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1985, at 93.
55. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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Archibald Cox on the occasion of Chief Justice Earl Warren's retire-
ment.5 6 Professor Cox said that Chief Justice Warren was distinguished
because he pushed aside weary arguments concerning the "proper role of
the judiciary" with the persistent questions "Is that fair?" or "Is that
what America stands for?" Professor Cox spoke of how the Warren
Court would be remembered:57
It will be recognized a century hence, I venture to think, no less than many
of us suppose today. . . [for establishing] the responsibility of government
for equality among men, the openness of American society to change and
reform, and the decency of the administration of criminal justice. ...
Would that we could say this about the Burger Court decades hence.
56. Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1969).
57. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss3/3
